GC104 Infection Outbreak: Infection Control
An infection outbreak is the occurrence of cases of a particular infectious disease in excess of what is normally expected in a defined community or area, requiring coordinated infection control measures such as surveillance, isolation, and containment to prevent further spread.
Infection Outbreak & Infection Control
Big Idea: Infection control exists because healthcare environments concentrate vulnerable patients and dangerous microbes in close proximity. Without systematic barriers (hand hygiene, precautions, surveillance, outbreak investigation), hospitals become amplifiers of infection rather than places of healing. This lecture, delivered by Prof. KY Yuen (Chair of Microbiology, HKU), covers: (1) the history and rationale of infection control, (2) definitions of HAI/CAI, (3) modes of transmission, (4) a two-tier precaution system, (5) how to investigate an outbreak step-by-step (illustrated by the landmark QMH intestinal zygomycosis outbreak from contaminated allopurinol), and (6) sharps injury and bloodborne pathogen management. [1]
Learning Objectives:
- Define community-acquired infection (CAI), hospital-acquired infection (HAI), healthcare-associated infection (HCAI), outbreak, and pseudo-outbreak
- List the four modes of transmission (contact, droplet, aerosol/airborne, parenteral) and examples of pathogens for each
- Describe standard precautions and transmission-based precautions (contact, droplet, airborne)
- Explain the steps of outbreak investigation
- Identify key measures: hand hygiene, PPE, needle safety, vaccination, post-exposure prophylaxis
- Apply infection control principles to clinical scenarios and past-paper stems
Exam Relevance: This topic is tested nearly every year — in MCQ (pathogen with outbreak potential, type of surveillance), SAQ (name MDR organisms by transmission mode, list airborne organisms, bloodborne viruses), and mini-cases (returning traveller isolation). The 2024 Fourth Summative SAQ Question 12 is a direct hit from this lecture. [2]
1. History & Definitions
The recognition in 1840s by Semmelweis that microbes can be transmitted within hospitals to susceptible patients and healthcare workers was the start of infection control. [3]
High Yield: Hand hygiene is now the most important measure in infection control. Semmelweis observed that puerperal fever (Group A Streptococcus) rates dropped dramatically when clinicians washed hands with chlorinated lime solution before going from the post-mortem room to the delivery room. [1][3]
Before SARS in 2003, infection control was often neglected — the lecture slide noting healthcare worker deaths (Dr Tse Yuen Man, Dr Cheung Sik Hin, etc.) emphasises that "nobody cares till 2003". The SARS experience transformed infection control from a neglected discipline into a central hospital function. [1]
| Term | Definition | Key Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Community-acquired infection (CAI) | Onset of symptoms before or within 48 hours of admission | The 48-hour cut-off is arbitrary but universally used [3] |
| Hospital-acquired infection (HAI) | Onset of symptoms after 48 hours of admission | Occurs in 5–10% (handout says 8%) of all in-patients; extends hospital stay by ~3 days [1][3] |
| Healthcare-associated infection (HCAI) | Infections acquired in healthcare settings other than acute care: nursing homes, dialysis centres, day surgery, chemotherapy units, or identified after discharge | Emerged because modern healthcare extends beyond acute hospital walls [3] |
| Outbreak | A statistically significant increase in occurrence of an infection above the background/baseline rate | May be 1 case of something rare (e.g., SARS) or many cases of something common (e.g., seasonal influenza) [3] |
| Pseudo-outbreak | Clusters of positive cultures without evidence of disease | Causes: lab contamination, change in surveillance methods/definitions [3] |
| Colonisation | Microbe occupies skin/mucosal surface without invasion | May cause disease when host defence weakens [1] |
Exam Trap: CAI vs HAI
A patient admitted with pneumonia that was incubating before admission but only declared 3 days later is still CAI if the incubation period and epidemiological evidence show community acquisition. The 48-hour rule is a practical guide, not absolute. Examiners love testing the definition.
High Yield — directly from the lecture slide: [1]
| Type | Approximate % | Key Association |
|---|---|---|
| Hospital-acquired UTI | ~30% (most common) | Urinary catheter |
| Hospital-acquired pneumonia | ~20–25% | Ventilator, tracheostomy |
| Surgical site infections | ~15–20% | Operative contamination |
| Intravascular catheter-related BSI | Included in "Others 35%" | Central lines, peripheral cannulae |
| Infected pressure sores | Included in "Others 35%" | Immobility, poor nursing care |
| Blood/blood product infections | Included in "Others 35%" | Transfusion |
HAI organisms are often MDR: MRSA, ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae, carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE), carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii, carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Candida auris, Clostridium difficile. [3]
2. Modes of Transmission
High Yield — this is the framework the entire lecture (and past papers) revolve around.
Four modes of transmission: (1) Contact, (2) Droplet, (3) Aerosol/Airborne, (4) Parenteral [1]
Direct contact: Person-to-person, skin-to-skin touch. The most common route of nosocomial transmission. Your fingers touch a colonised patient → you touch another patient or yourself → transmission.
Indirect contact: Touching a fomite (contaminated surface/object) recently contaminated by an infected person. SARS-CoV-2 can survive on surfaces (stainless steel, glass) for days — hence the rationale for surface disinfection and durable surface disinfection coatings. [1]
Clinical pathways of contact transmission: [1]
- Finger skin → skin: skin colonisation/infection
- Finger skin → mucosa (eye, nose, mouth): colonisation or acute respiratory infection
- Finger → GI tract (ingestion): GI colonisation or infectious diarrhoea
| Contact-transmitted Pathogens (from lecture) | Category |
|---|---|
| MRSA, VRE, Candida auris | MDR Gram-positive / yeast |
| MDR Enterobacteriaceae & non-fermenters | MDR Gram-negative |
| Norovirus, Rotavirus, C. difficile | Diarrhoeal pathogens |
| HSV, RSV | Viruses |
| Scabies | Parasitic infestation |
| Viral haemorrhagic conjunctivitis | Viral |
| Viral haemorrhagic infections | E.g. Ebola (also droplet/contact) |
| Highly contagious skin infections | Impetigo, etc. |
Droplets are particles > 100 µm (some sources say ≥ 5–6 µm); they are "sprayed" onto the face and fall to the ground within ~1–2 metres. [1]
- Sneezing/coughing can produce up to 40,000 droplets of 0.5–12 µm at velocities of 100 m/s [1]
- Speaking also generates large numbers of particles < 5 µm; emission rate correlates with loudness; some individuals are "speech super-emitters" [1]
- The nearer you are to the patient, the higher the density of fine aerosol [1]
| Droplet-transmitted Pathogens (from lecture) |
|---|
| Invasive H. influenzae type b |
| Invasive N. meningitidis |
| Diphtheria (pharyngeal) |
| Adenovirus |
| Influenza virus |
| Parvovirus B19 |
| Mumps & Rubella |
| Mycoplasma pneumoniae |
| Streptococcal pharyngitis |
| Pertussis |
| Pneumonic plague |
Aerosols are particles < 5 µm; they remain suspended ("floating") in the air for hours and can be inhaled over long distances. [1]
High Yield — The "airborne trio" + SARS-CoV-2: [1]
| Pathogen | Key Feature |
|---|---|
| Mycobacterium tuberculosis | Classic airborne; droplet nuclei; prolonged infectivity |
| Varicella zoster virus (VZV / Chickenpox) | Highly contagious; rash + respiratory secretions |
| Measles virus | R0 12–18, most contagious human virus |
| SARS-CoV-2 | Added to airborne list post-COVID-19 pandemic |
The Classic Airborne 3 + 1
Mnemonics vary, but for the exam: "MTV-S" = Measles, TB, Varicella, SARS-CoV-2. The first three are the traditional airborne trio; SARS-CoV-2 was added by Prof. Yuen's slide.
Parenteral routes: arthropod bites, needlestick injuries, surgery, transfusion, tissue/organ transplant. [1]
Bloodborne viruses of greatest concern (directly tested, 2024 SAQ Q12f): [2]
- HBV
- HCV
- HIV
Case illustration — blood product contamination: The lecture shows a case where a remnant blood bag (red cell unit serial 9019776) was found contaminated with Pseudomonas fluorescens at 5×10⁸ CFU/mL, with Gram smear and culture positive. This illustrates that bacterial contamination of blood products (though uncommon with modern screening) can cause fulminant sepsis. [1]
3. Outbreak Investigation — Step-by-Step
The lecture uses the QMH intestinal zygomycosis outbreak (2008–2009) as a teaching case. This is a landmark Hong Kong public health event worth understanding in detail.
- Index patient: 6-year-old boy, good past health, newly diagnosed acute lymphocytic leukaemia (ALL, blasts 78%), admitted to C6 ward at QMH. Received chemotherapy → became neutropenic → developed sudden RLQ pain, fever, confusion, hypotension → ICU admission → laparotomy revealed necrotic bowel with "cotton candy-like colonies" → Rhizopus microsporus identified. [1]
| Step | Action | Application in QMH Outbreak |
|---|---|---|
| Step 1: Verify clinical, microbiological & histological diagnosis | Confirm the infection is real, not a lab artefact | Tissue showed invasive zygomycosis; culture confirmed Rhizopus microsporus group [1] |
| Step 2: Case definition | Develop a working case definition (may be refined as investigation proceeds) | "R. microsporus in stool or intestinal tissue" — then 2-week enhanced surveillance (retrospective + prospective) across all Hospital Authority hospitals [1] |
| Step 3: Line listing | Tabulate all cases with relevant demographic, clinical, temporal, and exposure data | 12 cases identified across HA hospitals (QMH, PWH, QEH, TMH, PMH, UCH); classified as colonisation, mucosal, or invasive [1] |
| Step 4: Case finding | Actively search for additional cases via lab records, contact tracing | 394 stool samples screened; 1 additional colonisation case in a non-haem patient [1] |
| Step 5: Epidemic curve | Plot number of cases (Y-axis) vs time (X-axis) | Clustering from Sep 2008 to Mar 2009 → suggests a common source exposure [1] |
| Step 6: Confirm it is an outbreak (above baseline) | Compare current rate to historical baseline | Baseline for intestinal zygomycosis at QMH: 0/year. Even 1 case is significant. Clustering in haematology wards, intestinal manifestation (unusual for zygomycosis which is typically pulmonary/rhinocerebral/cutaneous) [1] |
| Step 7: Case-control study | Identify risk factors by comparing cases to matched controls | 9 cases vs 45 controls. Two factors reached statistical significance (p < 0.001): intake of allopurinol and intake of specific ready-to-eat food [1] |
| Step 8: Environmental/microbiological surveillance | Culture environmental samples, food, drugs, instruments | 709 specimens tested; Mucorales found in: allopurinol (1 drug), sandwiches (2), biscuits (3), wooden chopsticks (1); environment and medical instruments were all negative [1] |
| Step 9: Molecular typing | Establish clonality between patient and environmental isolates | ITS1-5.8S-ITS2 rRNA gene cluster sequencing identified 2 sequence types linking patient isolates to drug and food isolates [1] |
High Yield: All allopurinol samples cultured were positive for Rhizopus microsporus group (4 batches), with fungal count > 1000/gm. The allopurinol contained corn starch as an inactive ingredient — a natural substrate for Mucorales. [1]
Attack rate = (mucosal + invasive)/total = 6/18 = 33.3%. Only 1 of 8 symptomatic patients survived (12.5% survival). Projected over 1 year without intervention: 54 total cases, 36 asymptomatic, 18 symptomatic → ~16 lives saved by the outbreak investigation. [1]
Why Allopurinol?
Haematology patients on chemotherapy routinely receive allopurinol for tumour lysis syndrome prophylaxis (urate-lowering). The allopurinol tablets from a Chinese/HK manufacturer (Europharm) contained corn starch as an inactive ingredient. Corn starch is an excellent substrate for Mucorales (bread moulds). The manufacturing process failed to eliminate fungal contamination. This is why the European Pharmacopoeia sets limits: bacteria < 10³/g and fungi < 10²/g for oral preparations. The contaminated allopurinol had > 1000 fungi/g — a 10-fold breach. [1]
A high initial peak suggests a single, shared "common source" (e.g. contaminated food/drug batch). Controlling the source stops the outbreak. Person-to-person outbreaks give a longer, flatter curve with propagating peaks. [3]
Multidrug-resistant bacteria are often acquired silently from patients or food; and kill you many months or years later. [1]
The lecture diagram illustrates the cycle:
- Selective antibiotic pressure in hospitalised patients → resistant organisms (R) survive while susceptible organisms (S) are killed
- Resistant organisms colonise the patient
- Healthcare workers' hands pick up R organisms
- R organisms transfer to other patients, instruments, environment, clothing, shed skin scales
- Colonised/infected patients become new reservoirs
The only way to break this cycle is hand hygiene + antimicrobial stewardship.
5. Infection Control System: Two-Tier Precautions
High Yield: Standard precautions are applicable to ALL patients, regardless of diagnosis. They reduce the risk of transmission even when the presence of an infectious agent is unsuspected. [1][3]
Apply whenever contact with blood, body fluids, non-intact skin, mucous membranes, and secretions (except sweat) is possible. [1]
| Component | Details |
|---|---|
| Gloves | When handling blood, all body fluids, secretions, excretions, mucous membranes, or non-intact skin |
| Hand hygiene | Immediately after removing gloves; after all patient encounters; after touching contaminated materials; when moving from contaminated to clean site on the same patient |
| Masks + eye protection | For splash-prone procedures |
| Gowns | Disposable 100% polypropylene for splash-prone procedures |
| Needle safety | NEVER recap needles; dispose in puncture-resistant sharps container |
| Waste | Soiled linen/contaminated materials in impervious bags |
High Yield: "Hand hygiene: single most important infection control measure against nosocomial transmission of microbes." [1]
| Method | Agent | Duration | When to Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alcohol-based handrub | 65% alcohol + glycerol, 5 mL | 20 seconds | Default — at point of care, carried in pocket |
| Handwashing | Chlorhexidine soap + water | 30–60 seconds | When hands are visibly soiled (gross contamination); after contact with C. difficile or norovirus (alcohol doesn't kill spores well) |
When to perform hand hygiene: [1]
- After ALL patient encounters
- After touching potentially contaminated materials in patient environment
- When going from a contaminated part of a patient (e.g. wound) to a clean site (e.g. IV line) on the same patient
Alcohol vs Soap
Students commonly think handwashing with soap is always superior. In fact, alcohol-based handrub has a faster onset of action and is more effective against most organisms except spore-forming bacteria (C. difficile) and non-enveloped viruses. The lecture slide shows the time-course: alcohol achieves maximal efficacy within 20 seconds, while soap takes 30–60 seconds. Always wash with soap and water if you see or feel gross contamination. [1]
Applied when a specific diagnosis is suspected or documented, IN ADDITION to standard precautions. [1]
| Precaution Type | Rationale | Key Agents | Methods |
|---|---|---|---|
| Airborne | Aerosols < 5 µm float in air for hours | TB, VZV (chickenpox), Measles, SARS-CoV-2 | Negative pressure room; air changes ≥ 12/hr; anteroom; closed door; N95 respirator |
| Droplet | Particles > 5 µm; fall within 2 metres | Most respiratory viruses & bacteria (influenza, adenovirus, N. meningitidis, pertussis, etc.) | Surgical mask; face shield; maintain > 2m distance |
| Contact | Direct/indirect touch with patients or fomites | MRSA, VRE, C. auris, MDR GNB, diarrhoeal pathogens, HSV, RSV, scabies | Gloves on all patient contact; gown if substantial direct contact; dedicated equipment; hand hygiene |
High Yield — Mask Layers: The surgical mask has 3 layers: (1) water-repellent outer layer, (2) microbe-filtering melt-blown polypropylene middle layer, (3) water-absorbent inner layer. Always perform hand hygiene before putting on a respirator and perform a fit check every time for N95. [1]
6. Sharps Injuries & Bloodborne Pathogens
Occupational death rate data (US HCW, 2000–2002): Infection-related deaths (80–260 per 6.2 million HCW) exceeded injury-related deaths (77–93). The majority were from HBV (75–250 deaths); HCV, HIV, and TB contributed 5–10 deaths total. [1]
High Yield: [1]
| Step | Action |
|---|---|
| Vaccination | HBV vaccination (pre-exposure) |
| First aid | Wash wound immediately; squeeze to express blood |
| Serological testing | Test both source patient and victim for HBV, HCV, HIV |
| Post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) | HIV: antiretroviral therapy × 4 weeks; HBV: HBIG + vaccination (if non-immune) |
No PEP for HCV
There is no established post-exposure prophylaxis for HCV. The approach is monitoring with serial HCV RNA/antibody testing and treating if seroconversion occurs. Students often mistakenly assume PEP exists for all three viruses.
7. Scope of Infection Control (from Lecture Slide)
The scope of infection control includes: [1]
- Surveillance — ongoing data collection to establish baseline rates
- Outbreak investigations — when rates exceed baseline
- Hand hygiene, standard precautions, isolation procedures
- Setting and implementation of guidelines for patient care procedures, disinfection/sterilisation
- Monitor staff health and immunisation status
- Antimicrobial optimisation (stewardship) programme
- Led by an Infection Control Officer (clinical microbiologist or trained physician) [3]
- Infection Control Nurse (ratio: 1 per 250 beds in HK) [3]
- Roles include: annual IC plan, surprise ward visits, surveillance, outbreak investigation, education, needle-stick monitoring, antibiotic stewardship collaboration, environmental cleaning oversight [3]
The final outcome is determined by the interaction between the microbe and host defence/underlying disease. Infection control procedures: [1]
- Reduce risk and delay onset of HAI
- Prevent outbreaks or cross-infection (protect patients, staff, visitors)
- Cost saving
From the 2021 MCQ Q97 (COVID-19 universal community testing programme): the answer is Active surveillance. [4]
| Type | Definition | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Active surveillance | Health authority actively seeks out cases (e.g. universal testing, contact tracing) | COVID-19 universal community testing |
| Passive surveillance | Cases reported to authorities by clinicians/labs (standard notifiable disease reporting) | Statutory notification of TB |
| Sentinel surveillance | Selected sites/providers report on a specific condition | ILI surveillance at selected clinics |
| Syndromic surveillance | Monitors symptom patterns (not lab-confirmed diagnoses) | ED chief complaint data for early outbreak detection |
9. Additional Clinical Vignettes from the Lecture
- F/23, D20 post-C-section, persistent wound pain and discharge
- P/E: 37.5°C, inflamed wound, serous discharge, indurated wound edge
- Pus C/ST: WBC +++, No growth → think of organisms not growing on routine media
- Within 2 weeks, 35 similar cases at the same hospital
- Diagnosis: Mycobacterium abscessus (rapidly growing mycobacterium; requires special media and prolonged incubation; won't grow on routine bacterial culture within 48 hrs)
- This is an outbreak of surgical site infections — likely contaminated surgical instruments or water supply [1]
| Topic | Connection |
|---|---|
| GC 099 Antimicrobial Resistance | MDR organisms (MRSA, ESBL, CPE) are the main HAI pathogens; antimicrobial stewardship is part of IC scope |
| GC 061 HIV/Needlestick | PEP protocols for HIV (ARV × 4 weeks) and HBV (HBIG + vaccine) |
| GC 102 Fever after Chemotherapy | Neutropenic fever patients are the most vulnerable to HAI; reverse isolation, hand hygiene, low-bacteria diet |
| GC 103 Fever after Travelling | Returning travellers with pneumonia: consider airborne isolation for TB, MERS, novel influenza [6] |
| CFB WCS27 Surgical Infection | Infection control teams, patient isolation, ward discipline, antibiotic stewardship [7] |
| GC 107 Protect Yourself and Your Patients | Reinforces PPE, hand hygiene, vaccination |
12. Likely Exam Questions
Q1: Name the MOST COMMON MDR gram-positive bacterium transmitted by contact in hospital-acquired infections. A: MRSA (Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus) [1][2]
Q2: Name the MOST COMMON MDR gram-negative bacterium transmitted by contact in hospital-acquired infections. A: ESBL-producing or carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (e.g. E. coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae) — also accept carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii [1][2]
Q3: Name the MOST COMMON MDR yeast transmitted by contact in hospital-acquired infections. A: Candida auris [1][2]
Q4: Name the MOST COMMON bacterial cause of infectious diarrhoea transmitted by contact in HAI. A: Clostridioides (Clostridium) difficile [1][2]
Q5: Name three microbes commonly transmitted by airborne route in hospital. A: Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Varicella zoster virus, Measles virus (also accept SARS-CoV-2) [1][2]
Q6: Name three viruses well-known to be transmitted by blood products. A: HBV, HCV, HIV [1][2]
Q7: Thirty students develop vomiting without fever ~1 hour after eating egg-and-ham sandwiches from a street vendor. The most likely causative agent is: A. Norovirus B. Salmonella Enteritidis C. Staphylococcus aureus D. Clostridium perfringens E. Bacillus cereus A: C. Staphylococcus aureus — preformed enterotoxin in prepared food, short incubation (1–6h), vomiting-predominant, no fever [8]
Q8: The single most important infection control measure against nosocomial transmission is: A. Wearing gloves B. Wearing N95 respirator C. Hand hygiene D. Patient isolation E. Antibiotic stewardship A: C. Hand hygiene [1]
Q9: Which type of public health surveillance involves health authorities actively seeking out cases through universal community testing? A. Passive B. Active C. Sentinel D. Syndromic A: B. Active surveillance [4]
Q10: A returning traveller from Southeast Asia presents with pneumonia, high fever, and lymphopenia. Name two conditions that should prompt admission to an isolation ward. A: (1) Pulmonary tuberculosis, (2) Novel influenza / avian influenza (or MERS-CoV) — both require airborne precautions [6]
| Trap | Correct Approach |
|---|---|
| Confusing droplet vs airborne size cut-off | Airborne < 5 µm (floats for hours); Droplet > 5–100 µm (falls within 2m) |
| Thinking surgical mask protects against airborne organisms | Surgical mask is for droplet precautions only; N95 is needed for airborne |
| Assuming alcohol handrub kills C. difficile spores | It does NOT reliably kill spores → wash with soap and water for C. difficile |
| Forgetting SARS-CoV-2 is classified as airborne in GC104 | Prof. Yuen's slide explicitly lists it alongside TB, VZV, measles |
| Confusing outbreak with pseudo-outbreak | Pseudo-outbreak = positive cultures but no clinical disease (lab contamination, changed surveillance) |
| Thinking HCV has PEP | No established PEP for HCV — only for HIV (ARVs) and HBV (HBIG + vaccine) |
| Not knowing the HAI 48-hour definition | < 48h = CAI; ≥ 48h = HAI |
High Yield Summary
-
HAI = onset > 48h after admission; affects ~8% of inpatients; UTI (30%), pneumonia (20%), SSI (15%) are the top three.
-
Four modes of transmission: Contact (most common nosocomial route), Droplet ( > 5 µm, < 2m), Airborne ( < 5 µm, floats for hours — TB, VZV, Measles, SARS-CoV-2), Parenteral (needlestick, transfusion — HBV, HCV, HIV).
-
Two-tier precaution system: Standard precautions for ALL patients (hand hygiene, gloves, gowns, masks for splashes, sharps safety) + Transmission-based precautions (contact, droplet, airborne) when specific diagnosis suspected.
-
Hand hygiene is the single most important IC measure. Alcohol handrub 5 mL × 20 sec is default; soap and water 30–60 sec when visibly soiled or after C. difficile contact.
-
Outbreak investigation steps: Verify Dx → Case definition → Line listing → Case finding → Epidemic curve → Confirm above baseline → Case-control study → Environmental surveillance → Molecular typing → Control measures.
-
Sharps injury PEP: HIV = ARVs × 4 weeks; HBV = HBIG + vaccine; HCV = NO PEP (monitor and treat if seroconversion).
-
MDR contact-transmitted organisms to know: MRSA (Gram+), ESBL/CPE (Gram−), Candida auris (yeast), C. difficile (diarrhoea).
-
N95 for airborne; surgical mask for droplet; gloves + gown + dedicated equipment for contact.
Active Recall - Infection Outbreak & Infection Control
[1] Lecture slides: GC 104. Infection outbreak_infection control.pdf [2] Past papers: 2024 Fourth Summative SAQ.pdf (Question 12) [3] Lecture slides: GC 104. Infection outbreak_infection control [Handout].pdf [4] Past papers: 2021 Fourth Summative Assessment MCQ.pdf (Question 97) [5] Senior notes: Block A - Fever after a blood transfusion_ transfusion and related problems.pdf [6] Past papers: 2018 Fourth Summative Minicase.pdf (Section 4, Q11) [7] Lecture slides: CFB WCS27_Surgical Infection.pdf [8] Past papers: 2018 Fourth Summative MCQ.pdf (Question 26)
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